All of the above b. Which of the following represents a significant disadvantage to the corporate form of organization? Difficulty in transferring ownership.
Exposure to taxation of corporate earnings and stockholder dividend income. Degree of liability to which corporate owners and managers are exposed. Difficulty corporations face in obtaining large amounts of capital in financial markets. The chief financial officer CFO is usually the highest ranking officer in a corporation. The activities of the financial staff include: The primary goal of a publicly-owned firm interested in serving its stockholders should be to: Maximize expected total corporate profit.
Minimize the chances of losses. Maximize the stock price per share. Maximize expected net income. Managers that depart from the goal of shareholder wealth maximization run the risk of being removed from their jobs.
Most actions that help a firm increase the price of its stock also benefit society at large. The primary contribution of finance to total social welfare is its: Function as a productive resource. Contribution to the efficient allocation and use of resources. Role as an exogenous variable. Contribution to environmental protection. Most firms today have in place strong codes of ethical behavior, yet there are no obvious answers for many of the ethical questions facing many companies.
Socially responsible actions that increase costs may have to be put on a mandatory basis. An agency relationship arises whenever one or more individuals hire another individual or organization to perform some service and delegate decision-making authority to that agent.
In financial management the primary agency relationships are those between: Which of the following work to reduce agency conflicts between stockholders and bondholders? Providing managers with a large number of stock options. The passage of laws that make it easier for companies to resist hostile takeovers. All of the statements above are correct.
Which of the following actions are likely to reduce agency conflicts between stockholders and managers? Conflict between the debt holders and shareholders arises because of the difference in the risk appetite and the expected return. Debt holders are concerned about the current profit as it will ensure their return whereas equity shareholders might be willing to forgo the current profit for long-term capital appreciation.
As a result equity shareholders could invest even in risky projects with long gestation periods, which mar the interest of debt holders. Myers and Majluf in their pioneering work on pecking-order theory show that if the investors are not well informed about the information which the insiders have, the equity of that firm may be severely mispriced. In their paper they also show that if any firm wants to fund its new project by new equity then the equity can be so undervalued that the new investors will be better off by getting more value than the project's NPV.
So the organization will go for such a source which is not underpriced by the market like internal funds or riskless debt. So, in case of information asymmetry companies should follow an order of financing.
Myers refers to this order as the pecking order. As per the pecking order the firm first goes for internal funds and then for low risk debt and finally equity. As we have three major capital structure theories in the literature, it becomes an interesting task to test which theory characterises the behaviour of Indian firms in their determining the capital structure during the bullish phase of capital market.
Market timing, a comparatively old initiative see Myers, , is having a new surge of fame in the academic literature. In study by Graham and Harvey , managers carry on to offer support for the plan. Consistent with the behavior of market timing, firms inclined to issue equity subsequent a stock price run-up. Furthermore, researches that analyze long-run stock profits following business financing events find proof reliable with market timing. Lucas and McDonald investigate a dynamic adverse selection model that mix essentials of the pecking order with the market timing theory, which can give details of pre-issue run-ups but not post issue Under performance.
Baker and Wurgler said that capital structure is best perceived as the cumulative effect of precedent attempts to time the market. The basic suggestion is that managers look at existing circumstances in both debt market and equity markets.
If they found a need of financing, they use whichever market presently looks more favorable. If neither market looks positive, they may go for defer issuances. On the other hand, if present conditions look strangely favorable, funds possibly will be raised still if the firm has no need for any funds at this time. While this idea seems reasonable, it has not anything to say about most of the factors conventionally considered in studies of corporate financing.
However, it does propose that stock returns and debt market circumstances will play an significant role in capital structure decisions. The first paper on capital structure was written by Miller and Modigliani in , Showing that subject to some restrictive situation, the impact of leveraging on the worth of firm is immaterial; the conceptually provided that the worth of firm is not dependent upon the capital structure decision given that certain conditions are met.
Because of the unrealistic assumptions in MM irrelevance theory, research on capital structure gave birth to other theories. According to the traditional or static trade-of theory TOT , firms select optimal capital structure by comparing the tax benefits of the debt, the costs of bankruptcy and the costs of agency of debt and equity, that is to say the corrective role of debt and the fact that debt effects from informational cost than outside equity.
The Trade Off theory says that a firms adjustment toward an optimal leverage is influenced by three factors namely taxes, xosts of financial distress and agency costs. Baxter argued that the extensive use of debt increases the chances of bankruptcy because of which creditors demand extra risk premium. He said that firms should not use debt beyond the point where the cost of debt becomes larger than the tax advantage. In the so-called Pecking Order Theory POT Donaldson, ; Myers and Majluf, ; Myers, , because of asymmetries of information between insiders and outsiders, the company will prefer to be financed first by internal resources, then by debt and finally by stockholders' equity.
The debt ratio depends then on the degree of information asymmetry, on the capacity of self-financing and on the various constraints which the company meets in the access to the various sources of financing. So, in the pecking order world, observed leverage reflects the past profitability and investment opportunities of the companies.
Although, due to information asymmetries, market imperfections and transaction costs, many companies allow their leverage ratios to drift away from their targets for a time, when the distance becomes large enough managers take steps to move their companies back toward the targets. Following this approach, leverage must converge toward a target leverage ratio. That would no be the case following POT because managers make no effort to turn around changes in leverage. Two additional theories also reject the idea of timely meeting toward a target leverage ratio.
According to the theories of market timing and inertia, the capital structure is the result at a given time of an historical process. Supporters of the market timing approach Jalilvand and Harris, ; Korajczyk et al. Company's share prices will fluctuate around their factual value, and managers inclined to issue shares when the market-to-book ratio is high.
A small debt ratio must thus follow a long period of high market-to-book ratio. According to the managerial inertia approach Welch, companies do not adjust their debt ratio to the fluctuations of the market value of their equity. High market-to-book ratio must thus be accompanied by small debt. Graham and Harvey find that chief financial officers in the USA express concern about earnings' volatility in capital structure choices.
According to Mohammad M. Omran and John Pointon study, one of our issues of interest is whether debt is negatively associated with earnings' volatility, in which case firms react to the risk, and manage it by reducing debt. On the other hand, if debt is found to be positively associated with earnings' volatility, then they do not appear to manage the risk.
Ayesha Mazhar and Mohamed Nisar have discussed the determinants of capital structure of Pakistani firms. They selected a sample from Pakistani companies registered on Islamabad Stock Exchange. The sample is divided into two sub-samples of private and government owned companies to make comparison between both sectors.
The sample comprised 91 Pakistani companies out of which 80 companies are private and 11 are government owned covering the period of They have taken debt to equity as a proxy of leverage of a firm, and tangibility of assets, profitability, size, growth, tax provision and return on assets as independent variables.
All of the statements above are correct. a. Correct Which of the following actions are likely to reduce agency conflicts between stockholders and managers?
of the pecking order theory holds if ¡€ €½€ 0 and €½€ 1 PO ¢€, i.e., when the deficit in cash flow is entirely offset by the change in debt. The financing choice should be in favour of the financing instruments that are less risk and less sensitive to mis-pricing and valuation errors.
A test of the static trade off theory and the pecking order hypothesis by Shyam-Sunder and Myers () revealed that the pecking order model has a higher time-series explanatory power than . Pecking Order - Introduction The pecking order theory (Donaldson ) of capital structure is among the most influential theories of corporate leverage. The pecking order theory is based on different of information between corporate insiders and the market.
Pecking Order - Introduction The pecking order theory (Donaldson ) of capital structure is among the most influential theories of corporate leverage. The pecking order theory is based on different of information between corporate insiders and the market. According to Myers (), due to adverse selection, firm prefer internal to external finance. Analyse the pecking order and the trade-off theories of capital structure and assess the extent to which these are supported by the empirical evidence. Pecking Order - Introduction The pecking order theory (Donaldson ) of capital structure is among the most influential theories of corporate leverage.